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 WHY THE NSA DATA SEIZURES  
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
RANDY BARNETT* 
Due to the unauthorized leaks of classified information, we 
have come to learn that the National Security Agency (NSA), 
an executive branch arm of the U.S. military, has established 
several data collection programs. In this article, I am not going 
to get into the details of these programs. Instead, I will limit my 
focus to what I consider to be the serious constitutional prob-
lem with any such program, regardless of the details: the fact 
that the NSA is demanding that private companies, with which 
virtually all Americans contract to provide their voice commu-
nications, turn over the records of every phone call that is 
made on their systems.1 This metadata is then stored on NSA 
super computers for later analysis.2 
In this article, I am not going to address the legality of this 
program under existing statutes. Jim Harper of the Cato Insti-
tute and I have argued in an amicus brief that the NSA data 
collection program is illegal because it is not authorized by Sec-
tion 215 of the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act as it 
was modified by the USA PATRIOT Act.3 
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for educational use is hereby granted. 
 1. See Michael J. Glennon, National Security and Double Government, 5 HARV. 
NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 7 (2014); Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth 
Amendment in the Age of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 156–57 (2011). 
 2. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon custom-
ers daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order [http://perma.cc/5EAX-73CA]. 
 3. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute in Support of Petitioner, In re Privacy Info. 
Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (2013) (No. 13-58) available at http://object.cato.org/sites/ 
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tsac_cato_institute_13-58.pdf [http://perma.cc/HU3V-8LYH]. 
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Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act allows the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court (FISC) to issue orders requiring the 
production of tangible things upon satisfactory application by 
the FBI. The statutory language specifies that an application for a 
Section 215 order must include “a statement of facts showing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible 
things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation . . . .”4 
Because we maintain that Section 215 orders must be “relevant” 
to an already existing investigation, in our brief we contended 
that orders for the seizure of bulk metadata on every American 
for future analysis to uncover evidence of wrong doing are not 
authorized by the statute and are therefore illegal.5  
So far, however, the two federal district court judges who 
have considered challenges to the program in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York and in the District of Columbia have both held 
that, because Congress has not waived its sovereign immunity to 
allow the legality of Section 215 orders to be challenged in feder-
al court, federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear a statutory chal-
lenge.6 For this reason, this matter may need to be addressed by 
Congress. But these same two judges also held that citizens have 
standing to bring constitutional challenges to the collection of 
the telephone companies’ records of their phone calls.7 So my 
focus here will be limited to the constitutional issue raised by 
these blanket seizures of the private data on all Americans. 
Although the only surveillance program that has been chal-
lenged thus far concerns phone records,8 the principle offered 
to support this data seizure applies as well to all other business 
records of our dealings, including our credit card transactions. 
Indeed, in upholding the constitutionality of the program, 
Judge William Pauley of the Southern District of New York cit-
ed cases that held that “an individual has no constitutionally 
protected expectation of privacy” in bank records, records giv-
en to an accountant, subscriber information provided to an in-
ternet service provider, and information from a home comput-
                                                                                                        
 4. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 5. Cato Institute, supra note 3, at 3–5. 
 6. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 
F. Supp. 2d 724, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 7. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 9; Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 742–49. 
 8. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 7; Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 730. 
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er that is transmitted over the Internet or by email.9 Imagine 
the chilling effect on liberty if everyone knew that the govern-
ment is in possession of all this data about their private transac-
tions on its super computers. The relationship between the citi-
zens of the United States and their supposed agents or servants 
in government would be fundamentally reversed, turning We 
the People into mere subjects of our rulers. 
So there is a lot more at stake here than just this particular 
bulk data seizure program. With the challenge to the Afforda-
ble Care Act, we not only wanted to stop Obamacare from be-
ing implemented—which sadly we failed to do—we also want-
ed to defeat the limitless constitutional arguments that were 
being offered in its defense. In this effort, I am pleased to say 
we succeeded.10 Now, we need to think very hard about 
whether these blanket data seizure programs comport with the 
Fourth Amendment before, not after, the government decides it 
needs to seize data about every facet of our personal lives. 
I. BLANKET DATA SEIZURES ARE  
MODERN DAY GENERAL WARRANTS 
The Fourth Amendment has two parts. First, “The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated.”11 And second, “no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”12 
We know that the Fourth Amendment was adopted to pre-
vent, among other things, what were called “general” or non-
specific warrants, which were blanket authorizations for British 
authorities to search for contraband wherever they might 
choose. In response to this abuse, the Fourth Amendment re-
                                                                                                        
 9. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 749–51, n.16. 
 10. See Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (And Why 
Did So Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331, 1333 (2013). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 12. Id. 
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quires the things to be searched or seized under a warrant to be 
described “particularly.”13 
With this in mind, the problem with the data collection or-
ders issued to Verizon and other telecommunications compa-
nies becomes obvious. These orders require the company to 
produce “on an ongoing daily basis . . . all call detail records.”14 
Because they are not “particular,” such orders are the modern 
incarnation of the general warrants issued by the Crown. As 
with general warrants, blanket seizure programs subject the 
private information of innocent people to the risk of searches 
and exposure, without their knowledge and with no realistic 
prospect of a remedy. 
It is also worth remembering that both the English Whigs 
and the American Founding generation thought that the sei-
zure of papers for later search was an abuse distinct from, but 
equivalent to, the use of general search warrants—which is 
why “papers” was included in the Fourth Amendment in addi-
tion to “effects” or personal property.15 As University of San 
Diego School of Law Professor Donald Dripps has shown in a 
recent article, “at the heart of Whig opposition to seizing pa-
pers was the belief that any search of papers, even for a specific 
criminal item, was a general search. It followed that any warrant 
to sift through documents is a general warrant, even if it is spe-
cific to the location of the trove and the item to be seized.”16 
The seizure of one’s papers for later perusal was thought to be 
closely akin to searching through a person’s mind to assess his 
thoughts. Seize first, then search for evidence of criminality, 
was considered to be the epitome of an abuse of power.17 Put-
ting such information permanently in the hands of government 
for future use is an invitation to restrict the liberties of the peo-
ple whenever such restrictions become politically popular. 
                                                                                                        
 13. See Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching For History, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1727–28, 1731 (1996). 
 14. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted). 
 15. See generally Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the 
History of Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2013) (explaining how the seizure of papers to be later searched 
for evidence of criminality was considered to be a distinct but equally disturbing 
abuse from that of general warrants to search houses). 
 16. Id. at 104. 
 17. See id. at 67. 
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For example, gun rights advocates have long opposed fire-
arms registration because the brute fact that the government 
does not know where the guns are makes it much more difficult 
to confiscate them in the future.18 Not only does this illustrate 
the practical danger to constitutional liberties posed by the gov-
ernment simply possessing vast information about our activities 
and associations for later search. The trove of phone and email 
metadata to which the NSA now has access would make gun 
registration unnecessary as the government would already pos-
sess enough information to identify most gun owners.19 
A. Problems with the Constitutional Justifications  
of These Programs 
So how have these programs been justified as constitutional? 
The answer lies in two key Supreme Court cases. The first is 
the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,20 which concerned the 
power of law enforcement to wiretap a public phone booth.21 
Katz is taken to stand for the proposition that the Fourth 
Amendment protects only communications about which peo-
ple have a “reasonable expectation[] of privacy.”22 Because 
people reasonably expect their conversations in a phone booth 
to be private, their conversations cannot be wire-tapped by law 
enforcement without first obtaining a search warrant.23 Keep 
that phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” in mind, be-
cause it does a lot of work in modern constitutional doctrine. 
The second key case is Smith v. Maryland,24 decided in 1979. 
Smith applied what is called the “third-party doctrine” to 
phone call information in the possession of phone companies.25 
In Smith, the Court reasoned that individual phone users have 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the records of their 
                                                                                                        
 18. Nicholas J. Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the 
Remainder Problem, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837, 868–69 (2008). 
 19. See Chris W. Cox, The Battle Against Mass Government Surveillance, NRA (Feb. 
6 2014), http://www.nrapublications.org/index.php/16924/political-report-48/ 
[http://perma.cc/P2Q6-V9DQ]. 
 20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 21. Id. at 348–49. 
 22. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 23. Id. at 359, 367. 
 24. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 25. See id. at 744–45. 
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phone calls—the numbers called and the duration of the calls—
since phone users must know that a third party, the phone 
company itself, has access to this information. The Court there-
fore held that law enforcement agencies do not need a warrant 
to install what is called a “pen register” on a telephone account 
that records and reports the numbers called and the duration of 
the calls, but not the content of the conversations.26 
When the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Court, re-
sponding to public concerns, released its previously secret opin-
ion upholding the constitutionality of the NSA’s data seizure 
program, we learned that it thought that “the production of tel-
ephone service provider metadata is squarely controlled by the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Maryland.”27 The court 
reasoned that the NSA data collection orders are constitutional 
because all they collect is the very information in which Smith 
tells us that telephone consumers have no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy under Katz.28 On the surface, this logic seems ra-
ther persuasive, and indeed it has persuaded many legal experts 
and commentators, along with Judge Pauley of the Southern 
District of New York.29 
But there is a big difference between what happened in Smith 
and what the NSA orders are doing. In Smith, a robbery victim 
had described to the police both her attacker and a 1975 Monte 
Carlo she saw near the scene of the robbery.30 Afterward, she 
began receiving threatening and obscene phone calls from a 
man who said he was the robber.31 During one phone call, the 
man asked her to step out onto her front porch, where she saw 
the 1975 Monte Carlo moving slowly past her home.32 Later, 
the police spotted a man who met the victim’s description of 
                                                                                                        
 26. Id. at 741–42. 
 27. In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things 
from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2 (FISC Aug. 29, 2013). 
 28. Id. at *3. 
 29. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[B]usiness rec-
ords created by Verizon are not ‘Plaintiffs’ call records.’ . . . When a person volun-
tarily conveys information to a third party, he forfeits his right to privacy in the 
information.”). 
 30. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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her attacker driving a 1975 Monte Carlo in her neighborhood.33 
By tracing the license plate number, police learned that the car 
was registered in the name of petitioner, Michael Lee Smith.34 
They then asked the phone company to install a pen register at 
its central offices to record the numbers dialed from the tele-
phone at his home.35 Although the police did not obtain a war-
rant, they certainly had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Smith 
had engaged in illegal activity.36 
If the constitutionality of the NSA’s bulk data seizure pro-
grams is to be justified as akin to a pen register under Smith, 
however, then these programs amount to installing a pen regis-
ter on every American without any suspicion that a person, 
whose phone activities are now stored on the NSA’s super-
computers, has done anything wrong.37 In essence, every 
American is to be treated the way Michael Lee Smith was treat-
ed in Smith v. Maryland.38 But unlike the pen register on his 
phone line that lasted just a few days, each of us would have 
pen registers on our phone every day for the rest of our lives. 
In the old days, the government had to go to the third party to 
request the pen register be installed,39 which preserved a record 
of what it was doing. Moreover, had it tried to collect such in-
formation on everyone, the very massiveness of such a data trove 
would have itself prevented the government from storing it or 
doing much of anything else with it. Today, however, enormous 
quantities of data can be kept digitally in huge NSA facilities.40  
                                                                                                        
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional 
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 869 (2014). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 162 (1977) (noting that tele-
phone company refused to lease certain telephone lines to the FBI which were 
needed to install a pen register discretely). 
 40. Howard Berkes, Amid Data Controversy, NSA Builds Its Biggest Data Farm, NPR 
(June 10, 2013, 2:58 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/06/10/190160772/amid-data-
controversy-nsa-builds-its-biggest-data-farm [http://perma.cc/7XKJ-MLF5]; NSA 
Utah Data Center, UTAH FACILITIES (Sept. 14, 2011), http:// 
www.facilitiesmagazine.com/utah/buildings/nsa-utah-data-center [http://perma.cc/ 
797Q-522F]. 
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In its briefs, the government intimates that the NSA is sub-
jecting the data to computer analysis to reveal suspicious pat-
terns.41 But others have defended the retention of this data 
simply to facilitate future searches of records pursuant to later 
investigations.42 Once in possession of the data, however, the 
federal government can use it the same way British authorities 
used papers seized with general warrants for later perusal to 
see if they revealed anything criminal. The NSA data seizures 
make possible fishing expeditions into the phone calling pat-
terns of nearly all Americans, except for terrorists, who will 
now avoid using their phones.43 
 If this is the result, then there must be a flaw somewhere in the 
constitutional doctrine that produced it. And indeed the fault lies 
in the misuse of the “third-party doctrine” as well as in Katz’s 
problematic concept of the reasonable expectation of privacy. 
B. Misapplying Katz and Smith 
The key to understanding the flaw in the government’s the-
ory is to remember that the Fourth Amendment was, above all 
else, the solution to the problem of general or nonspecific 
warrants.44 In Smith v. Maryland,45 a pen register was placed 
by the phone company on a particular person about whom 
there was a reasonable suspicion—though perhaps not proba-
ble cause for seeking a search warrant.46 Indeed, previous ap-
plications of the third party doctrine to business records, such 
                                                                                                        
 41. Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 1, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (1:13-cv-03994-
WHP), 2013 WL 5744828; Brief for the United States in Opposition at 7–8, In re Elec. 
Privacy Information Ctr., 134 S. Ct. 638 (2013) (No. 13-58), 2013 WL 5702390. 
 42. See, e.g., Roger Pilon & Richard A. Epstein, NSA surveillance in perspective, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 12, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-06-
12/opinion/ct-perspec-0612-nsa-20130612_1_nsa-national-security-agency-privacy 
[http://perma.cc/WM7B-UV66]; Dianne Feinstein, NSA Call-Records Program Is 
Prudence, Not Prying, SFGATE (Nov. 2, 2013, 8:58 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/ 
opinion/article/NSA-call-records-program-is-prudence-not-prying-4947762.php 
[http://perma.cc/EK22-5Y3H]. 
 43. See Barbara Starr, Terrorists try changes after Snowden leaks, official says, CNN 
(June 25, 2013, 6:27 PM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/06/25/terrorists-try-
changes-after-snowden-leaks-official-says/ [http://perma.cc/7TT2-5FY3]. 
 44. Cloud, supra note 13, at 1727–31. 
 45. 442 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979). 
 46. Id. at 741–42. 
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as bank records or emails, have concerned investigations of a 
particular person or company.47 
So the first problem is that Smith v. Maryland is being stretched 
to cover a situation that is radically different than the law en-
forcement practice the Court was addressing there, and in sub-
sequent cases. Because this ongoing blanket data seizure of eve-
ry phone record in the country is unprecedented, the rationale of 
Smith cannot automatically be extended to this situation. 
This was the position taken by Judge Richard Leon of the 
District Court of the District of Columbia in his opinion finding 
that the NSA program violated the Fourth Amendment. “The 
question before me,” he wrote, 
is not the same question that the Supreme Court confronted 
in Smith. To say the least, “whether the installation and use 
of a pen register constitutes a `search’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment,”—under the circumstances ad-
dressed and contemplated in that case—is a far cry from the 
issue in this case.48 
For Judge Leon, the question to be decided today is: 
When do present-day circumstances—the evolutions in the 
government’s surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone hab-
its, and the relationship between the NSA and telecom com-
panies—become so thoroughly unlike those considered by 
the Supreme Court thirty-five years ago that a precedent like 
Smith simply does not apply? The answer, unfortunately for 
the Government, is now.49 
While lower courts are certainly bound to follow Supreme 
Court precedent, they are not required to extend general state-
ments made by the Court in one situation to an entirely differ-
ent context. Lower courts are supposed to grapple with apply-
ing existing doctrine to new situations, and this includes 
identifying the limits of existing doctrine given the circum-
stances in which it arose. 
 The crucial constitutional difference between Smith and all 
the “third-party” business records cases is particularity: the dif-
ference between a general warrant that the Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                        
 47. See Donohue, supra note 37, at 865–71. 
 48. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2013) (citations omitted). 
 49. Id. 
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was enacted to prohibit, and a reasonable particularized search 
or seizure, which is all the Supreme Court has ever purported 
to authorize.50 
C. Reconsidering Katz 
But when this case does get back to the Supreme Court—as I 
hope it will if Congress does not alter the practice as it recently 
failed to do51—the Court should also reconsider the “reasona-
ble expectation of privacy” concept of Katz. As Justice Alito ob-
served two terms ago in his concurring opinion in the GPS 
tracker case of United States v. Jones,52 the “Katz expectation-of-
privacy test . . . involves a degree of circularity, and judges are 
apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of 
the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test 
looks.”53 In addition, “the Katz test rests on the assumption that 
this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and 
stable set of privacy expectations.”54 
We should all remember that the “reasonable expectations” 
language that now dominates the academic literature and case 
law actually appears, not in the majority opinion of the Court 
in Katz, but in a solo-concurrence by Justice Harlan.55 In con-
trast with Justice Harlan’s concurrence, Justice Stewart’s major-
ity opinion in Katz properly rested on the physical protection 
that the defendant had given to his oral communications when 
he stepped into a phone booth and closed the door.56 “What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public,” he wrote “even in his 
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protect-
ed.”57 What Katz “sought to exclude when he entered the 
booth,” Justice Stewart continued, 
                                                                                                        
 50. See Donohue, supra note 37, at 786, 865–71. 
 51. See USA FREEDOM Act, S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 52. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (citations omitted). 
 53. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Katz v. United States,389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. at 352 (majority opinion). 
 57. Id. at 351. 
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was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear. He did 
not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls 
from a place where he might be seen. No less than an indi-
vidual in a business office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a 
taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts 
the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to 
place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he ut-
ters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.58 
Rather than airy and untethered judicial speculations about 
“reasonable expectations,” the courts should return to the tra-
ditional—and more readily administrable—property and con-
tract rights focus of Fourth Amendment protection that was 
reflected in the majority opinion in Katz. Courts should exam-
ine how people employ devices that function like the walls of 
the home, or the phone booth in Katz, to conceal digital infor-
mation and preserve their privacy. An inquiry into the physical 
and legal barriers people have placed around their information, 
for example, by using passwords to restrict access to their 
email, or entering into terms of service contracts with third par-
ties that include privacy protections, can generally answer 
whether they have held it close, and establish the threshold of 
personal security that the Fourth Amendment requires a war-
rant to cross. No distinction should be made between sealing a 
letter before handing it to the postman, taking a phone call in a 
secluded phone booth, password-protecting one’s email, or se-
lecting a communications company with a privacy policy. 
In short, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test reverses 
the inquiry required by the Fourth Amendment. For good reason, 
the Fourth Amendment uses a possessive pronoun—“their”—to 
describe the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” it protects. 
People’s ownership of themselves and their things is an essential 
counterweight to state power. And by availing themselves of the 
law of property and contract, people create their own zones of 
privacy. In short, first comes property and contract, then comes priva-
cy. With this in mind, let us return to Katz.  
 In reality, the physical and legal barriers people place around 
their information define both their actual and “reasonable” ex-
pectations of privacy and should provide the doctrinal touch-
                                                                                                        
 58. Id. at 352. 
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stone of the search warrant requirement. Two terms ago in Unit-
ed States v. Jones, the Supreme Court took an important step in 
this direction when it held that the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” formulation from Katz does not supplant the protection 
of one’s property from unreasonable searches, but instead adds 
additional protections to these.59 “[T]he Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test,” wrote Justice Scalia, “has been add-
ed to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”60 
And with regard to information of our private activity that is 
entrusted to third parties, the Court should now recognize that, 
when consumers enter into terms of service contracts, whether 
with telecommunications companies, banks, or credit card 
companies, containing privacy assurances, they “reasonably 
expect” their information to be used solely in ways specified in 
those policies.61 As Justice Marshall observed in his dissenting 
opinion in Smith, “[t]hose who disclose certain facts to a bank 
or phone company for a limited business purpose need not as-
sume that this information will be released to other persons for 
other purposes.”62 
When people put their information behind passwords, they 
“reasonably expect” it to be private, every bit as much as Mr. 
Katz did when he shut the door to the public phone booth.63 As 
Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurring opinion in Jones, the 
third-party doctrine “is ill suited to the digital age, in which 
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to 
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”64 The 
NSA’s program of “pen registers for everyone” has shown how 
the conventional reading of Katz’s “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test is patently unsuited for the age of mass storage of 
data accessed in secret and analyzed by super computers. 
Indeed, it is useful to remember that Justice Stewart, the au-
thor of Katz, actually dissented in Smith v. Maryland. “I think 
                                                                                                        
 59. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Donohue, supra note 37, at 765 (“Americans do not expect that their te-
lephony metadata will be collected and analyzed.”). 
 62. Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 63. Donohue, supra note 37, at 890. 
 64. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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that the numbers dialed from a private telephone—like the 
conversations that occur during a call,” he wrote, 
are within the constitutional protection recognized in Katz. It 
seems clear to me that information obtained by pen register 
surveillance of a private telephone is information in which the 
telephone subscriber has a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
The information captured by such surveillance emanates from 
private conduct within a person’s home or office—locations 
that without question are entitled to Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment protection. Further, that information is an inte-
gral part of the telephonic communication that, under Katz, is 
entitled to constitutional protection, whether or not it is cap-
tured by a trespass into such an area.65 
Presciently for purposes of analyzing the significance of in-
stalling pen registers for everyone, he added, 
The numbers dialed from a private telephone—although cer-
tainly more prosaic than the conversation itself—are not with-
out “content.” Most private telephone subscribers may have 
their own numbers listed in a publicly distributed directory, 
but I doubt there are any who would be happy to have broad-
cast to the world a list of the local or long distance numbers 
they have called. This is not because such a list might in some 
sense be incriminating, but because it easily could reveal the 
identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal 
the most intimate details of a person’s life.66 
When one has arranged one’s affairs using physics, or the 
laws of property and contract, to conceal information from 
preying eyes, government agents may not use surreptitious 
means or novel technologies like thermal imaging to defeat 
those arrangements without obtaining a warrant that conforms 
to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment.67 For this reason, 
the Court was correct in the 2001 case of Kyllo v. United States68 
to hold that police officers conducted a search when they used 
                                                                                                        
 65. Smith, 422 U.S. at 747–48 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 748. 
 67. Hunter Carpenter, Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—The Warrantless Use 
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16 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 38 
 
a thermal-imaging device to detect heat emanating from a pri-
vate home, even though they committed no trespass.69 
Putting oneself behind closed doors creates a zone of privacy 
into which the police ought not intrude without a warrant. As 
Justice Kagan explained last year in her concurring opinion in 
Florida v. Jardines,70 which involved the use of a drug sniffing 
dog, “[i]t is not surprising that in a case involving a search of a 
home, property concepts and privacy concepts should so align. 
The law of property ‘naturally enough influence[s]’ our ‘shared 
social expectations’ of what places should be free from gov-
ernmental incursions.”71 
Smith v. Maryland need not be reversed to distinguish its ap-
plication from the radically different practice of installing pen 
registers for everyone. Whereas Smith concerned a particular-
ized search that may well be “reasonable” under the Fourth 
Amendment, the NSA bulk-data seizure program is the mod-
ern-day equivalent of the general warrant that strikes at the 
very heart of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of particu-
larity. Both the third-party doctrine of Smith and the “reasona-
ble expectation of privacy” approach of Katz need to be 
adapted to modern circumstances. 
II. WHAT ABOUT THE WAR POWER  
AND NATIONAL SECURITY? 
Some who defend the NSA surveillance programs would say 
that these programs should not be constrained by the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments as domestic law enforcement is because 
they are exercises of the President’s inherent power as Com-
mander in Chief, or pursuant to the Congressional Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force against the terrorist organizations 
that attacked us on September 11th. As such, the FISA proce-
dures impose greater constraints on surveillance than was con-
stitutionally required, even to the point of including judicial and 
Congressional oversight of such surveillance. Indeed, some de-
fenders have said that it may well have been a mistake to in-
                                                                                                        
 69. Id. at 40. 
 70. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) 
 71. Id. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 
103, 111 (2006)). 
No. 1] NSA Data Seizures 17 
 
clude the judiciary within these procedures rather than let the 
President take full political responsibility for the use and abuse 
of such measures. This objection is a formidable one, requiring 
serious analysis of the scope and limits of both the President’s 
executive power and Congress’s resolution authorizing the use 
of military force. But let me offer some preliminary thoughts. 
 We can identify two legal models of constitutional powers. 
Call these the “domestic model” that empowers the govern-
ment to protect the rights of its citizens from being violated by 
other members of the community; and the “wartime model” 
that is designed to protect the rights of American citizens from 
being violated by foreign enemy powers. 
Constitutional protections against abuses of these powers 
vary. Consider that our military may kill enemy combatants in 
the field without any “due process of law” and may indefinite-
ly incarcerate prisoners of war for the duration of hostilities. 
Neither of these measures can constitutionally be done to 
American citizens domestically in time of peace or war. Nor 
can they be done to foreign nationals in peacetime. 
Those who would justify these programs under the war 
power are abandoning the domestic model. Therefore, any reli-
ance on Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” doctrine, or 
Smith’s “third-party doctrine,” are make-weights and merely 
confuse the issue. You cannot defend the program using the 
“third-party” doctrine and then, when pressed on that argu-
ment, change the subject to the war power. Any war power ar-
gument must stand and fall on its own. Perhaps for this reason, 
in its recent brief in the ACLU’s challenge to the NSA data sei-
zures, the government did not assert the war power and never 
denied that the Fourth Amendment applied to this situation. 
Although the government does rely on a “national security” 
theory of why the program is “reasonable” under the Fourth 
Amendment, even if it could be said to be reasonable to seize the 
phone records of every American in the interest of national secu-
rity, this rationale cannot justify using the NSA data for domestic 
law enforcement purposes—as we are learning may well have 
occurred—or any other comparable data collection program that 
is used for domestic law enforcement purposes. That such mis-
sion creep has already occurred, albeit in secret, underscores the 
danger of allowing such bulk data seizures in the first place. 
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That defenders of this program will alternate between the do-
mestic and war models of constitutional power signals that the 
conflict in which we are currently engaged does not fit neatly 
within either. The domestic model assumes that government is 
using its police powers to protect the rights of its citizens from 
others who are also members of the community. When citizens 
are accused of violating the rights of others that define the social 
compact, they deserve the benefit of the doubt before they are 
subjected to punishment. And we must be very careful to protect 
the civil liberties of the people from those in law enforcement who 
would abuse this police power to protect the public safety. 
The war model assumes that government is using its military 
power to protect the rights of its citizens from threats posed by 
foreign powers, in particular the armies of foreign govern-
ments. Unlike persons who are accused of domestic crimes, the 
soldiers of a foreign power are not entitled to the protections of 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. But these war powers do 
not stretch into perpetuity and are typically limited to a geo-
graphically confined theater of combat. Wars between nations 
have both a beginning and end, and extraordinary war powers 
expire with the conflict that necessitated their use. 
If the “cold war” between the United States and the USSR 
muddied the distinction between the domestic and war powers 
of the Congress and the President, what is sometimes called the 
“long war” against radical Islamic NGOs has threatened its col-
lapse. If the battle ground is considered to include the territory 
of the United States, the enemy is hidden among the popula-
tion, and such conflicts know no definitive end, adherence to 
the war power model threatens to completely subsume the pro-
tections of civil liberties afforded by the domestic model. In es-
sence, the means of war are then turned against the People 
themselves to identify an enemy within. 
Even if some blending of the models is warranted and that 
is what the original FISA and Patriot Acts were attempting to 
accomplish, it makes it all the more essential that the gov-
ernment not exceed the limits defined by these statutes. Con-
struing Section 215 as broadly as the government now urges, 
and the FISA court has ruled in its secret opinions, threatens 
the very balance between the wartime and domestic models 
that Congress was presumably trying to strike. For this rea-
son, the courts should avoid the constitutional issues by 
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holding that Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act does not au-
thorize the bulk seizure of the telephone and email commu-
nications records of all Americans. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude by noting that, without the recent leaks, the 
American public would have no idea of the existence of these 
programs, and it still cannot be certain of their scope.72 Every 
day seems to bring new revelations about domestic surveil-
lance by federal agencies. The secrecy of these surveillance 
programs is inconsistent with a republican form of government 
in which the citizens are the principals or masters, and those in 
government their agents or servants. For the people to control 
their servants, they must know what their servants are doing. 
Moreover, until these two district courts found—over the 
government’s objections—that citizens had standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the bulk-data seizure programs, 73 
their constitutionality had been assessed solely in secret by the 
FISC that Congress established to scrutinize the issuance of 
particular business record subpoenas and warrants.74 
The secrecy of these programs, and the proceedings by 
which their constitutionality is being assessed, make it impos-
sible to hold elected officials and appointed bureaucrats ac-
countable. Internal governmental checks, and even secret con-
gressional oversight, are no substitute for the sovereign people 
being the ultimate judge of their servants’ conduct in office. But 
such judgment and control is impossible without the infor-
mation that secret programs conceal. 
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If these blanket seizures of privately-held data are upheld as 
constitutional, it would constitute an unprecedented legal and 
constitutional sea change. It is not a policy that should emerge 
from an advisory panel of judges to which the people are not 
privy. The American people are no longer the subjects of King 
George and his general warrants. Nor should we be subjected 
to these modern-day general warrants by those who are sup-
posed to be our servants, not our masters. 
